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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND CIVILIAN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY:  
THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
by 
 Nicholos Palmer 
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science 
The University of North Carolina at Pembroke 
May 7, 2016 
 
 
This study, initially, hypothesizes that in Latin America and the Caribbean, citizens who believe 
that economic inequality is high and should be reduced are more likely to lose faith in 
democratic institutions. Numerous academic studies posit that democracy is declining in the 
region and income inequality coupled with anti-democratic leaders are responsible for this 
declivity. Other scholars argue that inequality does not undermine democracy per se; instead, 
citizens are fed up with the contemporary leaders’ approach in solving the issue. Citizens then 
support populist politicians through democratic means. Using an ordered logistic regression with 
the inclusion of country-level variables, I found that citizens who believe that the government 
should do more to reduce inequality are more likely to believe in the exceptionality of 
democracy. I therefore rejected the study’s main hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2 
Introduction 
During the Industrial Revolution and the resulting economic productivity that increased 
the transition towards formal economies and large private ownership of resources, the unfair 
distribution of wealth became an inherent feature of this economic order. In Europe, as is the 
general knowledge, the reaction was to push for welfare states, labor unions, socialism and 
revolutions. One can safely claim that, ever since, these ideological and political themes have run 
their way through modern history and are present to this day. Nowhere is this discourse more 
present than in Latin America and the Caribbean, which have the highest rates of inequality 
compared to other major regions.
1
 
Consequently, current governments have preoccupied themselves with finding ways to 
equilibrate economic growth and the undesirable, unequal distribution of wealth that it 
produces.
2
 In terms of Latin America, this story is known all too well. After the colonial years of 
elites alienating much of the population from the political scene, left-wing populism eventually 
took hold and import substitution policies were implemented.
3
 Subsequently, these policies 
slowed economic growth relative to other areas of the world and free market policies overrode 
ISI policies.
4
 In the contemporary period, inequality is still a major issue for the region. As 
mentioned, populism took root when the economic side effect of market economies (i.e. 
economic inequality) was at its highest.
5
 Nonetheless, although the masses came together and 
                                                          
1
 Ronn Pineo, “The Free Market Experiment in Latin America: Moving Beyond Past Policies to Search for a Pathway Forward,” Journal of 
Developing Societies 30, no.2 (2014): 172, accessed March 17, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0169796X14525534. 
2
 Francis Fukuyama, “Dealing with Inequality” in Poverty, Inequality and Democracy, eds. Francis Fukuyama, Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 7. 
3
  Craig Arceneaux, “Latin America” in The Other World: Issues and Politics of the Developing World, eds. Joseph N. Weatherby, Craig 
Arcenaux, Emmit B. Evans, Jr., Dianne Long, Ira Reed, and Olga D. Novikova-Carter (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 114-116. 
4
 Ibid 
5 Karen L. Remmer, “The Rise of Leftist- Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change,” Comparative Political Studies 
45, (2012): 5, accessed November 28, 2015, http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/12/05/0010414011428595.  
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exercised their right to vote, the leaders that were elected, in turn, abused power and increased 
executive authority at the expense of other branches of government.
6
  As these leaders may 
deliver on their populist agendas in the short term, it is argued that democracy (and, eventually, 
economic growth) is impeded in the long term.
7
 Consequently, citizens may be later 
disadvantaged both socially and economically due to the short term promises of reducing 
inequality.
8
 Still, will citizens knowingly denounce democratic institutions to support other 
forms of governance? 
This paper focuses on the relationship between the subjective evaluations of the 
economic conditions of citizens in Latin American and the Caribbean and their support for 
democracy. This paper first analyzes the literature documenting the region’s history with 
economic inequality and the effects it had on democratization. Secondly, the paper shifts focus 
onto the research question and hypotheses. Thirdly, I then transition to the methodological 
aspects of this paper and I explain the variables, research design and model. I conclude the paper 
with the analysis of statistical and discussion.   
Origins of Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 The economic history of Latin America and the Caribbean is marked by its shift from 
direct state influence in the economy to a market-based economy. Currently, the region has the 
highest inequality rates worldwide and one may surmise that the economic systems that were 
                                                          
6
 Alejandro Toledo, “Latin America: Democracy with Development" ” in Poverty, Inequality and Democracy, eds. Francis Fukuyama, Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 41. 
7
 Ibid, 44-45. 
8
 Ibid, 44. 
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employed failed to address that historic inequality.
9
 Latin America and the Caribbean’s (LAC) 
experience with economic inequality, like most regions, stemmed from the colonial era.
10
 
During the second and third quarters of the 20
th
 century, a majority of the governments of 
these countries employed import substitution and Keynesian policies so as to create a more 
inclusive economy.
11
 Although, these governments were led by populists who were often 
criticized for their lack of economic knowledge, it is reported that GDP per capita growth were at 
their highest as state-led industrialization spurred the economy.
12
 While these center-left policies 
were credited for their economic success, critics posited that side effects were corruption, 
entrenched bureaucracies, and impending bankruptcies on the part of the public sector.
13
 The 
alternative, of course, was the introduction of neoliberal policies. 
 While neoliberalism and its offshoots boosted the private sector, its disadvantages 
materialized in high poverty and inequality rates and low GDP growth.
14
 For example, the top 
1% of LAC’s rich were making more than 350 times more than the poorest 1%.
15
 Additionally, 
between 1980 and 2002, over 50 million people were living under $190 per day.
16
  
 
 
                                                          
9 Carol Graham and Sandip Sukhtankar, “Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Some Evidence 
from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being,” Journal of Latin American Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 350, accessed February 12, 2016, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0400745X. 
10
 Craig Arceneaux, “Latin America” in The Other World: Issues and Politics of the Developing World, eds. Joseph N. Weatherby, Craig 
Arcenaux, Emmit B. Evans, Jr., Dianne Long, Ira Reed, and Olga D. Novikova-Carter (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 114-116. 
11
 Ronn Pineo, “The Free Market Experiment in Latin America: Moving Beyond Past Policies to Search for a Pathway Forward,” Journal of 
Developing Societies 30, no.2 (2014): 172, accessed March 17, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0169796X14525534. 
12
Ibid. 
13
 Ibid, 173-174. 
14
 Ibid, 174-175. 
15
 Ibid, 178. 
16
 “Poverty and Equity,” World Bank, accessed March 17, 2016, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/LAC 
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Inequality and Democratization in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Today, as many democratic countries in the developing world continue to witness 
economic growth based on neoliberal principles set out by the Washington Consensus and other 
Western financial institution, inequality still poses a problem within their borders. Additionally, 
although economic inequality rates have slowly declined over last decade throughout the region, 
huge percentages of the society are still affected by chronic poverty and the evident wide income 
gap.
17
 
While democratization continues to be a challenging process for developing countries, 
many in Latin America and the Caribbean have instituted effective quasi-democratic institutions 
which would suffice for democracy being the dominant form of governance in the region.
18
 As 
such, with economic inequality still posing a problem for many in the region, this paper seeks to 
identify the relationship between the public’s subjective economic inequality and its perception 
of democracy as being an acceptable form of governance. 
Literature Review 
 Much of the literature posits that Latin America’s democratic institutions are still in need 
of effective democratization and the state of the economy is a factor that continues to affect this 
process. Prior research buttresses this trend. For instance, Graham and Sukhtankar found that 
                                                          
17
 Ronn Pineo, “The Free Market Experiment in Latin America: Moving Beyond Past Policies to Search for a Pathway Forward,” Journal of 
Developing Societies 30, no.2 (2014): 178-179, accessed March 17, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0169796X14525534. 
18
Huber and Stephens, Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America, 1-3 
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between 2000 and 2001, the satisfaction with democracy in Latin America decreased among the 
unemployed and self-employed due to the economic crisis at the turn of the century, which 
resulted in price hikes and instability that affect the poor and middle class more so than the upper 
class.
19
 Support for democracy increased after the crisis alleviated.
20
Furthermore, in a later study, 
Blanco and Grier found that inequality had a positive effect on political instability throughout the 
region, especially in Argentina.
21
 In other words, high inequality rate was correlated with high 
political disruption. The authors argue that Latin American and Caribbean policymakers should 
acknowledge this relationship and should aim to reduce inequality so as to lessen the likelihood 
of political instability.
22
  
However, while economic inequality may lower support for democracy, Graham and 
Sukhtankar further posit that citizens still believe in the legitimacy of democracy but instead 
have lost faith in contemporary democratically elected government.
23
 Roell and Crandall further 
goes on to highlight that economic upheavals have enabled Latin America to democratize over a 
long-term basis.
24
 The results of a 2013 Latinobarómetro poll published by The Economist 
showed that respondents support democratic institutions although they are cognizant of the 
                                                          
19
 Carol Graham and Sandip Sukhtankar, “Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Some Evidence 
from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being,” Journal of Latin American Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 372, accessed February 12, 2016, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0400745X. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier, “Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America,” Journal of Development 
Studies 45, no. 1 (2009): 88, accessed February 12, 2016, doi: 10.1080/00220380802264788. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Carol Graham and Sandip Sukhtankar, “Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Some Evidence 
from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being,” Journal of Latin American Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 349, accessed February 12, 2016, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0400745X. 
24
 Riordan Roett and Russell Crandall, “The Global Economic Crisis, Contagion, and Institutions: New Realities in Latin America and Asia,” 
International Political Science Review 20, no. 3 (1999): 281, accessed April 18, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0192512199203003. 
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unequal distribution of wealth; for example, Venezuelan respondents favored democratic 
interventions than authoritarian methods of remedying the economy.
25
  
Research Question 
Consolidated democracies have some of the highest indicators of economic development 
and modernization.
26
 However, with the economic inequality that usually accompanies 
globalization and modernization (elements of economic development in today’s age), do the 
citizens of the so-called Global South prefer another form of governance that not only bolsters 
growth but also tries to reduce economic inequality? In narrower terms, does economic 
inequality incite a lack of faith in democratic institutions and government? This paper 
hypothesizes that, in Latin America and the Caribbean, citizens who believe that economic 
inequality is high and should be reduced are more likely to lose faith in democratic institutions. 
Methodology 
Data 
For this study, I used data from the 2012 wave of the Americas Barometer, which is a 
multi-country survey headed by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion 
                                                          
25 “Latinobarómtero Poll: Listen to me,” Economist.com, last modified November 2, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21588886-
slightly-brighter-picture-democracy-not-liberal-freedoms-listen-me 
26
 Kapstein, Ethan, B. and Nathan Converse, “Why Democracies Fail" in Poverty, Inequality and Democracy, eds. Francis Fukuyama, Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 29-32. 
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Project.
27
 This data set includes individual-level responses and covers 26 countries across the 
Western Hemisphere. The survey covered a total of 41, 632 respondents. Table I. shows the 
summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. 
Table I. Summary of Variables 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Support for Democracy 14,128 5.190827 1.740216 1 7 
Independent Variable      
Inequality Ideology 14,363 5.765369 1.58251 1 7 
Control Variables      
Political Orientation 14,553 5.433175 2.696042 1 10 
Years of Education 14,553 9.986532 4.168122 0 18 
Ethnicity 14,553 2.433381 1.263456 1 7 
Employment Status 14,553 1.624888 1.050448 1 4 
Age  14,491 36.29874 13.73065 16 99 
Sex 14,553 1.364805 0.4813918 1 2 
Country-level Variables      
Gini coefficient 14,553 49.42877 6.025308 40.5 60.8 
GDP per capita 14,553 6283.831 3931.981 766.9 15127.6 
Level of Democracy 14,100 6.400867 1.057219 3.96 8.17 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is Support for Democracy. In order to measure this variable, I 
used the variable ing4 of the 2012 wave of the Americas Barometer survey. This variable records 
responses to the question: “Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is 
                                                          
27
 The Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org. 
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better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this 
statement?” The responses are coded from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree).  
Primary Causal Variable 
In order to analyze how respondents’ economic condition affect their Support for 
Democracy, I took into account the independent variable Inequality Ideology. I used the variable 
ros4 from the Americas Barometer survey poses the question: The [country] government should 
implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? The answers are placed on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree). I hypothesize that individual-level 
responses concerning support for government action to alleviate income inequality affect 
respondents’ support for democracy. I thus treat Inequality Ideology as a primary causal variable 
in my model. 
Control Variables 
 In order to account for other potential factors that may influence the respondents support 
for democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, I include in this model respondents Sex and 
Age. To measure both variables, I used variables q1 and q2 of the Americas Barometer survey. 
The Age variable accounted for the ages of 16 to 99. 
  10 
Due to Latin America and the Caribbean’s diversity, I control for the respondents’ 
Ethnicity. However, due to the high rates of racial egalitarianism
28
, I don’t expect Ethnicity to be 
statistically significant although I expect a positive relationship in that Indigenous and non-white 
groups to support democracy. While Latin America and the Caribbean are recognized for their 
high levels of cosmopolitanism, the existence of indigenous movements and native identity 
doubtlessly affects politics in the region.
29
 The literature highlights that ethnic divisions and 
racism usually translate into democratic ideals such as activism, assembly, minority ethnic 
representation in government and decentralization of power to ethnic communities.
30
I used the 
variable etid from the Americas Barometer survey. I however, used the major responses (White, 
Mestizo, Indigenous, Mullatto, Black and Other) in this analysis as they make a significant 
sample of respondents that answered the question: Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, 
indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? This is a categorical and the responses are coded 
1 (White), 2 (Mestizo), 3 (Black), 4 (Mulatto) 5 (Other). 
 It is a general belief within the social sciences that higher educational attainment is 
usually positively correlated with higher democratic participation among citizens. Thus the 
educational attainment (Years of Education) of respondents is controlled for in this study so as to 
                                                          
28
 Pena, Yesilernis, Sidanius, Jim, and Mark Sawyer, “Racial Democracy in the Americas: A Latin and U.S. Comparison,” Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology 35, no. 6 (2004): 749, accessed March 28, 2016, doi: 10.1177/0022022104270118. 
29
 I.S.R. Pape, “Indeginous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in 
the Bolivian Highlands,” Latin American Perspectives 36, no.4 (2009): 101, accessed March 28, 2016, http://0-
lap.sagepub.com.bravecat.uncp.edu/content/36/4/101.full.pdf+html. 
30
 Judith A. Morrison, “Social Movements In Latin America” in Social Movements in Latin America: The Power of Regional and National 
Networks., eds. Kwame Dixon and John Burdick (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 257-261. 
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test the generalizability of the education-democracy theory. As it relates to support for direct 
democracy, it was found that voters who lacked a college degree were “less supportive of direct 
democracy compared to college graduates.”
31
 While this study centralized on direct democracy 
as opposed to republican democracy and while the results were relevant to studies in North 
America; I hypothesize that the relationship in this paper will mirror that of the aforementioned 
study. That is, the more years of education one receives the more likely they are to support the 
idea of democracy. I used variable “ed” which represents the years of schooling for respondents. 
The responses range from 0 (None) to 18 (18+ years).   
 As stated, most of Latin American and the Caribbean countries took on more leftist 
sentiments in regards to the executive branches of government. However, while the region has 
taken on more left-wing populist sentiments, democracy is still the dominant form of 
governance. Consequently, the question arises: how much does one’s Political Orientation 
influence his/her support for democracy? It is evident that LAC’s shift to left-wing governments 
is and was influenced by growing leftist sympathy among the electorate. However, although 
most of these governments and their officials threaten and undermine democracy, does it 
necessarily mean that their leftist supporters intentionally put them in office to do just that. 
Seligson writes that in Latin America as one’s political ideology becomes more leftist the less 
                                                          
31
 Loren Collingwood, Levels of Education and Support for Direct Democracy,” American Politics Research 40, no.4 (2012): 571, accessed 
April 4, 2016, doi: 10.1177/1532673X11428805. 
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credence that person has in the Churchillian view of democracy which is means that democracy 
is the best form of all other governing systems.
32
 I also hypothesize, in this study that the more 
left one becomes the more they will lose belief in that democracy is the best form of governance. 
In order to measure how respondents Political Orientation impact their support for democracy, I 
included in the model item (1l) from the Americas Barometer. Responses are coded from 0 (left) 
to 10 (right). 
Economic crises usually result in disruption in the labor market. Graham and Sukhtankar 
found that trust in democratic institutions were shaken among those who were self-employed and 
unemployed after a brief economic crisis that hit the region in the early 2000’s.
33
 Consequently, I 
also account for respondents’ Employment Status by utilizing variable ocup4a of the Americas 
Barometer survey. Responses are coded from 1 to 7. I recoded the data so as to only take into 
account respondents who are “Working,” “Not Working, but have a job,” “Actively looking for a 
job,” and “Students.” By recoding the data, as is seen in the previous sentence, I am able to 
account for individuals who may be employed, laid off, and cyclically employed. The altered 
responses are now coded 1 to 4.  
Country level variables 
                                                          
32
 Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Rise of Populism and the Left in America,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 18 (2007): 88, accessed April 6, 2016, 
doi: 10.1353/jod.2007.0057. 
33
 Carol Graham and Sandip Sukhtankar, “Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Some Evidence 
from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being,” Journal of Latin American Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 372, accessed February 12, 2016, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0400745X. 
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I also account for systemic variables and the effect they may have on the dependent 
variable. The 2012 Gini coefficients of 13 of the 17 countries were added to the data set using 
the gini variable. The data was acquired from the World Bank database.
34
 The Gini index 
measures a country’s distribution of wealth among its citizens with 0 being perfect equality and 
100 perfect inequality. Belize, Guatemala, Jamaica and Nicaragua did not report 2012 data to the 
World Bank. I however used the 2013 Gini coefficients of these countries which were obtained 
from the UNDP Human Development Report Office.
35
 
 Economic development is strongly correlated with development and democratization, in 
particular.
36
 I took into account the effect that countries GDP per capita could have on the 
dependent variable. Consequently, gdp variable was used and it covered 2012 GDP per capita 
data. The indicators were obtained from the World Bank.  
I also included the level of democracy in the model. The level of democracy is measured 
using the Economic Intelligent Unit’s Democracy Index. The index has an overall score that 
ranges from 0-10 and the scores are divided and categorized into full democracies; flawed 
democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes.
37
 The scores of all countries were 
                                                          
34
 “GINI index (World Bank Estimates),” World Bank, accessed April 6, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI 
35
 “Income GINI coefficient,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed April 12, 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-
coefficient 
36
 Francis Fukuyama, “Dealing with Inequality” in Poverty, Inequality and Democracy, eds. Francis Fukuyama, Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 7-8. 
37
 “Democracy at a Standstill,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, accessed April 19, 2016, 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Democracy%20Index.pdf. 
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documented except that of Belize which was not included in the Democracy Index. The dem 
variable accounts for these scores. 
Results 
Four models were tested to estimate the effects of the above variables on Support for 
Democracy. The models are ordered logistic regressions. Model 1 predicts from the variables 
Inequality Ideology and Political Orientation. Model 2 adds variables Ethnicity and Employment 
Status both of which are categorical variables. The responses were singled out in the model in 
order to capture how each responses affected the dependent variable. Model 3 further 
incorporated the individual-level variables Sex and Age.  Finally, Model 4 adds controls for 
country-level variables, such as for the Gini coefficients, GDP per capita and the Level/State of 
Democracy. The results are documented in Table II.  
 
 
 
                       Table II. Determinants of Support for Democracy, Ordered Logistic 
Regression Model 
 Model 1 
b/(SE) 
Model 2 
b/(SE) 
Model 3 
b/(SE) 
Model 4 
b/(SE) 
Individual- level 
variables 
    
 0.275*** 0.277*** 0.279*** 0.268*** 
  15 
Inequality Ideology (0.0383) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0314) 
 
Political 
Orientation 
0.0469* 
(0.0232) 
0.0476* 
(0.0227) 
0.0459* 
(0.0223) 
0.0466* 
(0.0210) 
Years of Education  0.0437*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0556*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0524*** 
(0.0106) 
Ethnicity     
Mestizo  -0.307 
(0.187) 
-0.302 
(0.178) 
-0.238* 
(0.0946) 
Indigenous  -0.381 
(0.228) 
-0.367 
(0.216) 
-0.148 
(0.150) 
Black 
 
 0.0228 
(0.217) 
-0.0131 
(0.214) 
0.269* 
(0.123) 
Mulatto  -0.145 
(0.211) 
-0.128 
(0.208) 
-0.160 
(0.132) 
Other  -0.422* 
(0.202) 
-0.433* 
(0.201) 
-0.340* 
(0.146) 
Employment 
Status 
    
Off Work  0.180 
(0.305) 
0.184 
(0.309) 
0.199 
(0.286) 
Unemployed  -0.167 
(0.117) 
-0.0815 
(0.0909) 
-0.0217 
(0.0941) 
Student  -0.155* 
(0.0705) 
 
0.0703 
(0.0501) 
0.129* 
(0.0535) 
Age 
 
 
 
  0.0146*** 
(0.00305) 
0.0148*** 
(0.00278) 
Sex   -0.105* 
(0.0515) 
-0.104* 
(0.0488) 
Gini    -0.0253 
(0.0189) 
GDP    0.0000784* 
(0.0000391) 
Level of Democracy    -0.161 
(0.155) 
N 14010 14010 13953 13533 
BIC 48154.9 47959.1 47596.2 45930.8 
Standard errors in parentheses                                                                                                                                                                        
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Model 1 disconfirms the proposed hypothesis that citizens who perceived that inequality 
should be reduced are more likely to view democracy as an imperfect form of governance. The 
results were highly statistically significant (p<0.001). It is also worth noting that this significance 
  16 
is consistent across all for models, highlighting that the effect of Income Ideology did not change 
as more variables were incorporated. Model 1 disconfirms the hypothesis that as citizens become 
more leftist they are more likely disagree that democracy is the best form of government.
38
 The 
The Political Orientation coefficient was positive and statistically significant (p<0.05) across all 
four models. These results however may also highlight that those on the right may lose faith in 
democracy and favor extreme right-wing populism as the latter is also undermines democracy.
39
 
The results from Model 2 further buttress the hypothesis as citizens acquire more Years of 
Education they are more likely to believe that democracy is the best of all other forms of 
governance. 
40
The coefficients of Years of Education remained highly statistically significant 
(p<0.001) across Model 2 to 4.  
Model 2 also included the dummy variables Ethnicity and Employment Status. As it 
relates to Ethnicity, respondents who identified themselves as “Mestizos” and “Indigenous” were 
less likely than those who identified as “White” to have a Churchillian view of democracy. 
However the findings were not statistically significant in the second and third models, except for 
the findings related to Mestizos which was significant in the final model. Those who identified as 
“Black” were more likely to favor democratic institutions. This finding may stem from the fact 
                                                          
38
 Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Rise of Populism and the Left in America,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 18 (2007): 88, accessed April 6, 2016, 
doi: 10.1353/jod.2007.0057. 
39
 Kurt Weyland, Why Latin America is Becoming Less Democratic, The Atlantic, July 15, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/why-latin-america-is-becoming-less-democratic/277803/ 
40
 Loren Collingwood, Levels of Education and Support for Direct Democracy,” American Politics Research 40, no.4 (2012): 571, accessed 
April 4, 2016, doi: 10.1177/1532673X11428805. 
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that black people, especially those in South America, may regard democratic mechanisms as 
effective ways of representing their interests in such a varied socio-political landscape.
41
 
Respondents who identified as “Other” were also less likely to agree. This finding remained 
statistically significant across models. Employment Status did not have a significant effect on 
Support for Democracy. Students however were more likely to disagree on the exceptionality of 
democracy than those who were employed. The results were only statistically significant in the 
second and fourth models. 
In terms of Age and Sex, as the age of respondents increased the likelihood of supporting 
democracy also increased. Males, however, were less likely to believe in the exceptionality of 
democracy. The results were statistically significant in Model 3 and 4.  
Of the three country-level variables, only GDP per capita was statistically significant. 
The result was in keeping with the positive relationship between economic well-being and 
democracy – countries with higher purchasing power parity are more likely to be have higher 
rates and, in this case, Support for Democracy. 
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Conclusion 
 Latin America and the Caribbean underwent a systemic transition which scholars have 
identified as the third wave of democratization.
42
 Although the region ranks high in democratic 
standards compared to other regions of the so-called Global South, economic inequality remains 
a challenge.
43
 Consequently, this phenomenon has given rise to the “New Left” as progressive 
populist leaders have gained influential power throughout the region.
44
 Many perceive this as a 
threat to democracy as these leftist and, sometimes rightwing authoritarians, seek to reform the 
economic and political fabric of their respective countries.
45
 Nonetheless, these potential 
reformers were only able to acquire their status through the support of the masses.
46
 This paper 
focused on the relationship between subjective perceptions of inequality and subjective support 
for democracy and its institutions.   
Much of the literature posit that democracy is indeed threatened in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and inequality largely fuels this threat. This paper sought to add more basis to the 
existing literature. The proposed hypothesis states that, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
                                                          
42
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45
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citizens who believe that economic inequality is high and should be reduced are more likely to 
lose faith in democratic institutions. 
In developing the model to test this relationship, I controlled for respondents’ Political 
Orientation, Years of Schooling, Ethnicity, Employment Status, Sex and Age. I also incorporated 
institutional-level variables: Gini coefficient, GDP per capita and Level of Democracy. Using an 
ordered logistic regression, I ran four models to analyze how the effects of variables would vary. 
 The results however did not mirror that of much of the literature and it also disconfirmed 
my hypothesis. In sum, I rejected the hypothesis. Respondents who believed that the government 
should reduce inequality were more likely to believe that democracy is the best form of 
government. This result buttresses Graham and Sukhtankar’s claim that respondents in Latin 
America still favor democracy although they may believe that the current democratic 
government (such as democratically elected officials) is ineffective. The results however 
confirmed the hypotheses that those who identified as leftists are less likely to have a 
Churchillian view of democracy and that those who are have more education are more likely 
agree that democracy is exceptional. Additionally, the results further established the positive 
correlation between economic development and democratization as an increase in GDP per 
capita may likely translate to an increase in subjective support for democratic institutions. 
  20 
 In conclusion, this paper centralizes on a fundamental feature of the socio-economic and 
political makeup of the region. More research is warranted in this field. Although a majority of 
the literature posits a decline in the support for democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
this paper may point to a different perspective of approaching the relationship between inequality 
and democratization in the region.  
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Appendix A  
 
Table I. Summary of Variables 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Support for Democracy 14,128 5.190827 1.740216 1 7 
Independent Variable      
Inequality Ideology 14,363 5.765369 1.58251 1 7 
Control Variables      
Political Orientation 14,553 5.433175 2.696042 1 10 
Years of Education 14,553 9.986532 4.168122 0 18 
Ethnicity 14,553 2.433381 1.263456 1 7 
Employment Status 14,553 1.624888 1.050448 1 4 
Age  14,491 36.29874 13.73065 16 99 
Sex 14,553 1.364805 0.4813918 1 2 
Country-level Variables      
Gini coefficient 14,553 49.42877 6.025308 40.5 60.8 
GDP per capita 14,553 6283.831 3931.981 766.9 15127.6 
Level of Democracy 14,100 6.400867 1.057219 3.96 8.17 
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Appendix B  
Table 2. Determinants of Support for Democracy, Ordered Logistic Regression Model 
 Model 1 
b/(SE) 
Model 2 
b/(SE) 
Model 3 
b/(SE) 
Model 4 
b/(SE) 
Individual- level 
variables 
    
 
Inequality Ideology 
0.275*** 
(0.0383) 
0.277*** 
(0.0313) 
0.279*** 
(0.0313) 
0.268*** 
(0.0314) 
 
Political 
Orientation 
0.0469* 
(0.0232) 
0.0476* 
(0.0227) 
0.0459* 
(0.0223) 
0.0466* 
(0.0210) 
Years of Education  0.0437*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0556*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0524*** 
(0.0106) 
Ethnicity     
Mestizo  -0.307 
(0.187) 
-0.302 
(0.178) 
-0.238* 
(0.0946) 
Indigenous  -0.381 
(0.228) 
-0.367 
(0.216) 
-0.148 
(0.150) 
Black 
 
 0.0228 
(0.217) 
-0.0131 
(0.214) 
0.269* 
(0.123) 
Mulatto  -0.145 
(0.211) 
-0.128 
(0.208) 
-0.160 
(0.132) 
Other  -0.422* 
(0.202) 
-0.433* 
(0.201) 
-0.340* 
(0.146) 
Employment 
Status 
    
Off Work  0.180 
(0.305) 
0.184 
(0.309) 
0.199 
(0.286) 
Unemployed  -0.167 
(0.117) 
-0.0815 
(0.0909) 
-0.0217 
(0.0941) 
Student  -0.155* 
(0.0705) 
 
0.0703 
(0.0501) 
0.129* 
(0.0535) 
Age 
 
 
 
  0.0146*** 
(0.00305) 
0.0148*** 
(0.00278) 
Sex   -0.105* 
(0.0515) 
-0.104* 
(0.0488) 
Gini    -0.0253 
(0.0189) 
GDP    0.0000784* 
(0.0000391) 
Level of Democracy    -0.161 
(0.155) 
N 14010 14010 13953 13533 
BIC 48154.9 47959.1 47596.2 45930.8 
Standard errors in parentheses                                                                                                                                                                        
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
